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ESTATES BY THE ENTIRETY IN 
BANKRUPTCY 
The principal goals of federal bankruptcy law are inherently 
conflicting. On the one hand is the policy that liquidation1 and. 
distribution of the debtor's assets should yield as much as possi-
ble to satisfy creditors' claims.2 On the other hand is the policy 
that the debtor should be protected from overreaching creditors 
and should retain enough of his assets to embark on a financial 
"fresh start."3 The Code's exemption provi.sions are intended to 
strike an equitable balance between these conflicting policy 
objectives.' 
Exemptions under the Bankruptcy Act of 189811 were deter-
mined solely by reference to state law.8 The Bankruptcy Reform 
Act of 19787 liberalized the Code's exemption provisions by al-
lowing debtors to choose between two distinct exemption sys-
tems. Under the new Code a debtor may elect either (1) a set of 
uniform federal exemptions,8 or (2) the exemptions provided by 
1. The issues discussed in this Note arise when the debtor files for chapter 7 liquida-
tion, or "straight" bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (Supp. IV 1980). For a thorough 
discussion of chapter 7 liquidation, see Rendleman, Liquidation Bankruptcy Under the 
'78 Code, 21 WM. & MARYL. REV. 575 (1980). These issues also arise when a debtor seeks 
a ·wage earner relief plan under chapter 13. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (Supp. IV 1980). 
2. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, 
H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, at 70-80 (1973), reprinted in App. 2 COL-
LIER ON BANKRUPTCY (15th ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION REPORT]. 
3. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 126 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. 
CooE CONG. & An. NEWS 5963, 6087, and in App. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY (15th ed. 
1981) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 595); see also Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 
234, 244 (1934) ("One of the primary purposes of the bankruptcy act is to 'relieve the 
honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit him to start afresh 
free from the obligations and responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes'.") 
(quoting Williams v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1915)). 
4. See Ackerly, Tenants by the Entirety Property and the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 
21 WM. & MARY L. REV. 701, 724-25 (1980). 
5. Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, amended by Act of June 22, 
1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (repealed 1978). 
6. See 4A COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 11 70.17(7) (14th ed. 1978). 
7. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified primarily at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 
(Supp. IV 1980)). The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 is called the Bankruptcy Code in 
reference to its codification as positive law- in title 11 of the United States Code. 
8. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(l) (Supp. IV 1980). 
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state law and federal nonbankruptcy law.9 Most state legisla-
tures, pressured by claims that bankruptcy law had become too 
pro-debtor,10 have enacted laws which preclude their citizens 
from electing the relatively liberal federal exemptions.11 A 
debtor who chooses - or is restricted to - non-Code exemp-
tions may exempt any interest in entirety property to the extent 
that it is exempt from process under applicable nonbankruptcy 
law. 12 Where the estate by the entirety is still recognized, this 
exemption allows married couples to place beyond the reach 
of their individual creditors a virtually unlimited amount of 
property. 13 
This Note argues that the exemption for entirety property 
should be abolished. Part I examines the treatment of entirety 
property under the Code and illustrates the conflict between the 
entirety exemption and ·federal bankruptcy policy. Part II dis-
cusses procedural devices that creditors employ to subject en-
tirety property to bankruptcy distribution. 
I. ENTIRETY PROPERTY AND BANKRUPTCY POLICY 
The estate by the entirety is based on the legal fiction that 
husband and wife are one, and that a conveyance of property to 
both of them creates one estate which is separate from each 
9. Id. § 522(b)(2). 
10. See, e.g., Farnsworth, A Rising Tide of Bankruptcies, N.Y. Times, July 28, 1980, 
§ 4 at 2, col. 1. 
11. As of September 24, 1981, 32 state legislatures had "opted out," pursuant to 11 
U.S.C. § 522(b)(l) (Supp. IV 1980), thus precluding their residents from electing Code 
exemptions. These states are Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, 
Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, 
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina; South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, West Vir-
ginia, and Wyoming. Telephone interview with H. Kent Presson, Assistant Chief, Bank-
ruptcy Division, Administrative Office of the United States Courts (March 29, 1982). 
12. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 1980). 
13. See infra notes 14-24 and accompanying text. 
The original version of the new bankruptcy law, drafted by the Commission on the 
Bankruptcy Laws of the United States ("the Commission"), proposed maximum limits 
on exemptions to prevent this result. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 171; 
Kennedy, New Bankruptcy Act Impact on Consumer Credit, 33 Bus. LAW. 1059, 1063-64 
(1978). Congress, however, adopted a provision drafted by the national Conference of 
Bankruptcy Judges, which failed to establish similar maximums for non-Code exemp-
tions. See Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on H.R. 31 & 32 Before the Subcomm. on 
Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d 
Sess. pt. 3, at 1282 (1976) (statement of Bankruptcy Judge Joe Lee) [hereinafter cited as 
House Hearings]. 
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spouse's individual property. 14 Married couples are unrestricted 
in the amount of entirety property they may hold or the length 
of time they may hold it, 111 so long as they do not convert nonex-
empt assets into entirety property on the eve of bankruptcy.16 
14. 2 H. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY § 430 (3d ed. 1939). The estate by the 
entirety resembles a joint tenancy in that both require the unities of time, title, interest, 
and possession. The additional requirement of unity of marriage distinguishes the estate 
by the entirety from a joint tenancy. See 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§ 6.1-6.4 (A.J. 
Casner ed. 1952); Ackerly, supra note 4; Bienenfeld, Creditors v. Tenancies by the En-
tirety, 1 WAYNE L. REV. 105 (1955); Hines, Real Property Joint Tenancies: Law, Fact 
and Fancy, 51 lowA L. REV. 582 (1966). 
15. Couples may hold entirety property until one of them dies or they divorce. 2 
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 14, § 6.6, at 24. 
16. The Code's legislative history states that purposeful conversion of nonexempt as-
sets to exempt assets on the eve of bankruptcy is not fraudulent per se. "As under cur-
rent law, the debtor will be permitted to convert nonexempted property into exempt 
property before filing a bankruptcy petition. The practice is not fraudulent as to credi-
tors, and permits the debtor to make full use of the exemptions to which he is entitled 
under the law." H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 3, at 361. It is equally clear, however, that 
such conversions are prohibited if they are done with fraudulent intent to shield assets 
from the reach of creditors. 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 11 522.08(4), at 522-33 to -34 (15th 
ed. 1981). In most cases, it is not readily apparent from the facts of the case whether the 
conversion was actually fraudulent. A review of the cases reveals a high correlation be-
tween a finding of fraudulent intent and a significant increase in the debtor's exemptions 
immediately prior to filing. Compare Love v. Menick, 341 F.2d 680 (9th Cir. 1965) (per-
mitting the debtor to retain additional $460 in exemptions when, on advice of counsel, he 
cashed a life insurance policy which was partially exempt under state law and deposited 
the funds in a federal savings and loan association, rendering them completely exempt), 
and Wudrick v. Clements, 451 F.2d 988 (9th Cir. 1971) (allowing exemption because no 
secured creditors were prejudiced - though general creditors might be - when, on ad-
vice of counsel, a couple refinanced their car, paid off a previous car loan, and deposited 
$800 in a savings and loan association), with Kangas v. Robie, 264 F. 92 (8th Cir. 1920) 
(disallowing exemption when, a short time before filing, debtor retained money from his 
business rather than depositing it daily in the bank, ceased paying trade obligations, and 
purchased property into which he moved his family with intent to claim a homestead 
exemption), and Peyton v. Farmers Nat'! Bank, 261 F. 326 (5th Cir. 1919) (disallowing 
exemption when debtor, who purchased a house and lot two days before filing a petition, 
did not occupy the house or secure possession, nor disclose his intent to obtain a home-
stead exemption). See also First Tex. Sav. Ass'n v. Reed (In re Reed), 11 Bankr. 683 
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1981); First Nat'! Bank v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 8 Bankr. 650 
(Bankr. D. S.D. 1981). The possibility that debtors would convert large amounts of assets 
disturbed many who were involved with the passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act: "It 
may be that in some states of the union this is not much of a problem, where exemptions 
are small; but here in California the amount of assets that a person contemplating bank-
ruptcy can hide from his creditors with the assistance of a smart attorney is astounding." 
;House Hearings, supra note 13, pt. 3, at 1356 (letter of Bankruptcy Judge Aaron K. 
Phelps). The consensus is that, 
[the Code's· position] will protect those who have only a small amount of assets. 
Such debtors would be left with possibly not even a minimal amount of assets 
after liquidation if their small amount of property was not converted into ex-
empt property. Though some states· are liberal in the exemptions that they al-
low, thus creating the possibility of abuse in "bankruptcy planning," it must be 
remembered that many states as well as section 522(d) of the Code establish 
minimal exemptions as a floor. 
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At common law, the right of survivorship was indestructible and 
neither spouse could convey the fee - and creditors could not 
levy on it - without the consent of the other.17 In the majority 
of the twenty-six jurisdictions that recognize the estate, credi-
tors of only one spouse still may not reach entirety property.18 
Ap. individual domiciled in one of these majority states may pre-
vent the use of entirety property for distribution to individual 
3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 11 522.08(4], at 522-36 (15th ed. 1981) (footnote omitted). 
States that permit a debtor to exempt entirety property could be called liberal. Unless 
the value of the newly converted entirety property is minuscule, the conversion of such 
nonexempt assets in these states will be closely watched. Cf. In re Pappa, (1979-1981 
Transfer Binder] BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 11 67,249 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 1979) (finding 
debtor's conveyance of residence - originally held as a tenancy by the entirety - to his 
wife to.be fraudulent); Resnick, Prudent Planning or Fraudulent Transfer? The Use of 
Nonexempt Assets to Purchase or Improve Exempt Property on the Eve of Bankruptcy, 
31 RUTGERS L. REV. 615, 630 (1978). Numerous cases from courts in Michigan and other 
states have held that conversion of nonexempt property into entirety property is fraudu-
lent. See, e.g., Glazer v. Beer, 343 Mich. 495, 72 N.W.2d 141 (1955); Dunn v. Minnema, 
323 Mich. 687, 36 N.W.2d 182 (1949); Brydges v. Emmendorfer, 311 Mich. 274, 18 
N.W.2d 822 (1945); Annot., 7 A.L.R.2d 1104 (1949). 
17. See 2 H. TIFFANY, supra note 14, at§§ 434, 436; 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, 
supra note 14, at § 6.6. The unity of marriage causes differences in the treatment of 
creditors. Because joint tenants own undivided moities of the whole with equal rights to 
enjoyment of the property, their rights of· survivorship are destructible and they may 
destroy the tenancy, thus creating divided interests and enabling creditors to levy on 
those interests. 2 H. TIFFANY, supra note 14, at § 425. In a tenancy by the entirety, 
however, the husband and wife each own the entire estate, not merely an undivided frac-
tional interest, thus adding the element of indestructibility. 
18. Delaware, the District of Columbia, Florida, Indiana, Maryland, Missouri, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virgin Islands, Virginia, and Wyoming treat the 
estate by the entirety as follows: 
The usufruct is divided equally between husband and wife. (The present interest 
in the usufruct may be either a divided or an undivided one-half interest of each 
in the whole.) Neither the husband nor the wife individually can sell his or her 
present interest. Neither the husband nor the wife can sell his or her right of 
survivorship. Neither the present interest nor the right of survivorship of either 
spouse may be levied upon by their individual creditors. 
Craig, An Analysis of Estates by the Entirety in Bankruptcy, 48 AM. BANKR. L.J. 255, 
258 (1974); In re Thomas, 14 Bankr. 423 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981) (interpreting Ohio's 
new statute). As in the above states, Michigan and North Carolina also preclude individ-
ual creditors from reaching the estate by the entirety. These two states, however, other-
wise treat this estate differently. Id. at 297-99. This Note considers only the treatment of 
entirety property in the majority states. 
In at least one state where creditors may levy on the debtor's right of survivorship, 
bankruptcy courts have prevented the trustee from severing other interests in an estate 
by the entirety. See Ray v. Dawson (In re Dawson), 10 Bankr. 680 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.), 
aff'd, 14 Bankr. 822 (E.D. Tenn. 1981); Waldschmidt v. Shaw (In re Shaw), 5 Bankr. 107 
(Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1980); see also Resnick & Finkel, A Tenant by the Entirety in Liq-
uidation Under the Bankruptcy Code: When a House May Not Be a Home, 86 CoM. L. 
J. 286 (1981). See generally Plumb, The Recommendations of the Commission on the 
Bankruptcy Laws-Exempt and Immune Property, 61 VA. L. REv. 1, 114-18 (1975). 
State law in Massachusetts and Kentucky may yield similar results. See Craig, supra, at 
258-59. 
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creditors in bankruptcy by choosing state exemptions pursuant 
to section 522(b).19 Only a creditor of both husband and wife can 
prevent such an exemption - either by utilizing the expanded 
jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts to obtain a sale of the prop-
erty, 20 or by obtaining a stay of the discharge in order to pursue 
the entirety property in state court.21 But few courts have uti-
lized their expanded jurisdictionzz and few creditors appear 
aware of the stay of discharge.23 Consequently, if only individual 
creditors are involved, or if a joint creditor fails to obtain ex-
panded jurisdiction or a stay, debtors often are able to exempt a 
substantial amount of entirety property. 24 
Such liberal exemptions fail to implement bankruptcy policy 
and harm society by raising the cost of credit. Bankruptcy is 
costly to creditors because liquidation of a debtor's assets rarely 
yields enough to satisfy creditors' claims.H The more property in 
the bankruptcy estate, the smaller creditors' losses will be. Thus, 
19. See, e.g., In re Thomas, 14 Bankr. 423 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981); In re Lunger, 14 
Bankr. 6 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981); Williamson v. Denson (In re Williamson), 11 Bankr. 
791 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1981); In re Barsotti, 7 Bankr. 205 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1980); Bass v. 
Thacker (In re Thacker), 5 Bankr. 592 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1980); In re Ford, 3 Bankr. 559 
(Bankr. D. Md. 1980) (en bane), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Greenblatt v. Ford, 638 F.2d 
14 (4th Cir. 1981). 
20. See infra notes 49-65 and accompanying text. 
21. See infra notes 66-84 and accompanying text; Ackerly, supra note 4, at 701 pas-
sim. Creditors of only one spouse will be referred to as individual creditors. Creditors of 
the debtor and the nonindebted spouse will be referred to as joint creditors. An example 
of a joint creditor is a creditor holding a guaranty of payment from both husband and 
wife. 
22. See Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Chrystler (In re Trickett), 14 Bankr. 85 (Bankr. W.D. 
Mich.), appeal filed, No. K 81-379 (W.D. Mich. 1981); Martine v. Cipa (In re Cipa), 11 
Bankr. 968 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1981); Hadley v. Koehler (In re Koehler), 6 Bankr. 203 
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1980); see also Waldrop v. Phillos (In re Phillos), 14 Bankr. 781 
(Bankr. W.D. Va. 1981). 
23. Letter from Bankruptcy Judge George L. Proctor to the author (Jan. 29, 1982) 
(on file with the Journal of Law Reform); see also Waldschmidt v. Shaw (In re Shaw), 5 
Bankr. 107, 112 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1980) (savings and loan association failed to obtain 
a stay of discharge). 
24. Entirety property can include any or all of the debtor's most valuable assets, such 
as a house or, in some states, a car. This result has caused many commentators toques-
tion this form of property ownership. See 2 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, supra note 14, 
at § 6.6; Committee on Changes in Substantive Real Property Principles, Report, 1944 
A.B.A. SEC. REAL PROP. PROB. & Ta. L. REP. 82; Huber, Creditor's Rights in Tenancies 
by the Entireties, l B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. RBv. 197, 206-07 (1960); Grilliot & Yocum, 
Tenancy by the Entirety: An Ancient Fiction Frustrates Modern Creditors, 17 AM. Bus. 
L.J. 341, 352-53 (1979); Wilkerson, Creditors' Rights Against Tenants by the Entirety, 
11 TENN. L. REv. 139, 147-48 (1933). A limited statutory exemption could alleviate this 
potential inequity. See Comment, Entireties Property: The Effect of Bankruptcy on 
Creditors' Rights, 28 U. PITI'. L. REv. 267, 291 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Comment, 
Creditors' Rights]. 
25. See D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM 20-24 
(1971). 
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one bankruptcy policy is to maximize the property in the estate 
to lessen creditors' losses.28 A competing bankruptcy policy, 
though, is to ensure the economic rehabilitation of the debtor, 
leaving him free of debt with enough property to embark on a 
financial "fresh start. "27 The Code fulfills this second policy by 
exempting certain property from the bankruptcy estate. 
Bankruptcy law must strike the appropriate balance between 
maximizing the property available to creditors and maximizing 
.the property available to the debtor. The unlimited exemption 
of entirety property upsets this balance. Because the sole pur-
pose of the exemption provision is to aid the debtor's economic 
rehabilitation, it should be subject to maximum as well as mini-
mum limits/'18 If no maximum limitation exists, the policy of re-
ducing creditors' losses is ignored. 
Creditors pass their losses on to businesses and consumers in a 
variety of ways: higher interest rates, tighter controls on the 
availability of credit, or any number of methods by which such 
losses are channeled through the political-economic system.29 As 
the value of exemptions offered to debtors increases, others in 
the economic system suffer increased aggregate costs. Therefore, 
liberal exemptions without specified maximums increase the cost 
of credit and decrease credit availability. 
To preserve the proper balance between the conflicting inter-
ests of debtors and creditors, a debtor's interest in entirety 
property should be included in the bankruptcy estate for distri-
bution. The debtor's spouse should be compensated for his or 
her share of the proceeds from the sale of such property. 30 The 
dominant policy consideration for retaining entirety property in-
terests - protecting the family dwelling from the overreaching 
26. See supra note 2. 
27. See supra note 3. 
28. This was the position adopted by the Commission. COMMISSION REPORT, supra 
note 2, at 171. 
29. See Kennedy, Reflections on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States: The 
Debtor's Fresh Start, 76 W. VA. L. R.Ev. 427, 428 (1974). If increased borrowing costs 
cause a contraction of credit, those in the high-risk class of consumers may suffer most. 
30. This result could be accomplished through either state legislation or an amend-
ment to the Code, though the latter would be more efficient. If the Code were amended 
to abolish the entirety exemption, estates by the entirety would be severed and sold 
under 11 U.S.C. § 363(h) (Supp. IV 1980), and a proportionate share of the proceeds 
from sale of the entirety property would be given to the nondebtor spouse, id. § 363(j). 
Authority for such legislation is found in the bankruptcy clause of the Constitution, U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. See C. WARREN, BANKRUPTCY IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 8-9 
(1935); Martin, Substantive Regulation of Security Devices Under the Bankruptcy 
Power, 48 CoLUM. L. REV. 62, 74 (1948); 10 Comment, Constitutional 
Law-Bankruptcy-Frazier-Lemke Amendment, S. CAL. L. REv. 474, 478-79 (1937). 
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of one spouse is more suitably accomplished by homestead 
exemptions, 31 which exist in most states. 32 
In addition to the economic costs of the entirety exemption, 
other problems apparent under the old Act were left unresolved 
by Congress, if not made worse. One is the newfound ability of a 
debtor to retain entirety property in fee simple when his spouse 
dies during the administration of the case.33 Under the old Act, 
if the debtor's spouse died within six months after the debtor 
filed, all interest in the estate by the entirety vested in the trus-
tee. 34 Under the new Code, however, the estate includes only 
property that the debtor acquires by bequest, devise, inheri-
tance, a property settlement agreement with the debtor's spouse, 
or as the beneficiary of a life insurance policy.311 Consequently, 
the Code does not automatically bring exempted entirety prop-
erty into the estate if the debtor's spouse dies within 180 days of 
filing. The death of the debtor's spouse merely triggers the 
debtor's right of survivorship - which in the majority states 
may not be levied upon by creditors of one individual spouse -
and yields the full. fee simple. 38 
31. See 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 14, § 6.6, at 32. 
32. See 1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 14, § 5.75, at 810. 
33. This discussion assumes that state exemptions and federal nonbankruptcy ex-
emptions have been chosen. If the debtor chooses Code exemptions, his interest in the 
estate by the entirety is brought into the estate under the broad reach of 11 U.S.C. § 
541(a) (Supp. IV 1980). See Kennedy, supra note 13, at 1064. 
The debtor's death during the case does not cause exempted entirety property to pass 
to the estate in the majority jurisdictions. As under the old Act, the nonindebted spouse 
takes the property in fee simple by virtue of the right of survivorship. See 2 H. TIFFANY, 
supra note 14, § 430, at 218. 
34. The old Act provided: 
All property, wherever located, except insofar as it is property which is held to 
be exempt, in which the bankrupt has at the ·date of bankruptcy an estate or 
interest by the entirety and which within six months after bankruptcy becomes 
transferable in whole or in part solely by the bankrupt shall, to the extent it 
becomes so transferable, vest in the trustee and his successor or successors, if 
any, upon his or their appointment and qualification, as of the date of bank-
ruptcy. 
Bankruptcy Act § 70a, 11 U.S.C. § 110a (1976) (repealed 1978). When the debtor's 
spouse dies, the debtor becomes vested with the whole of the estate by the entirety by 
virtue of the right of survivorship. This usually results in the vesting of a fee simple 
interest. See 2 H. TIFFANY, supra note 14, § 430, at 219. As the fee is transferable, this 
provision would bring the property into the estate under the old Act. See Craig, supra 
note 18, at 264-66. · 
35. 11 U.S.C. § 54l(a)(5) (Supp. IV 1980). See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 11 541.07 
[8J(b], at 541-35 (15th ed. 1981). 
36. See 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 14, § 6.6, at 29; 2 H. TIFFANY, 
supra note 14, § 430, at 218. Furthermore, the debtor's creditors cannot reach the 
debtor's interests in exempted property to satisfy a pre-petition debt. See 11 U.S.C. § 
522(c) (Supp. IV 1980). 
The congressional subcommittee considering the two bankruptcy bills in 1976 was 
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The sort of abuse most likely to occur as a result of this loop-
hole is the filing of a bankruptcy petition in anticipation of the 
death of one's spouse. 87 Congress might have been reluctant to 
compel a debtor to find a new home while suffering from the 
death of a spouse and the stigma of bankruptcy. More likely, 
however, Congress did not consider this eventuality. Sounder 
policy would treat all debtors equally. The enlargement of the 
debtor's interest in entirety property due to the death of the 
nonindebted spouse should be treated as if it were property ac-
quired by inheritance, and thus brought into the estate. 38 The 
debtor might argue that such inclusion would be inequitable be-
cause he would lose all exemptions in the former entirety prop-
erty, whereas, had he chosen Code exemptions, some of this 
property would have remained exempt. However, in states which 
have not "opted out" of giving the debtor a choice of exemp-
tions, the debtor could probably amend his schedule to obtain at 
least the minimum exemptions provided by the Code.89 
warned of this result. House Hearings, supra note 13, pt. 4, at 2052-53 (statement of 
William T. Plumb, Jr.). Despite this warning, § 541(a)(5) Vfas not substantively altered 
from the section proposed by the Commission, § 4-601(a)(4). See COMMISSION REPORT, 
supra note 2, pt. 2, at 147. The Commission drafted § 4-601(a)(4) with the understand-
ing that other sections of its draft included entirety property in the estate in all cases, 
thus precluding any problem with the right of survivorship. See id., pt. 1, at 195-96. 
However, when the proposal of the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges to offer 
debtors a choice of exemptions was adopted, 11 U.S.C § 522(b) (Supp. IV 1980); see H.R. 
REP. No. 595, supra note 3, at 126, the Commission's § 4-601(a)(4) was left unaltered, 
perhaps due to an oversight on the part of Congress. Thus, when the debtor has chosen 
state exemptions and the debtor's spouse dies within 180 days after the petition is filed, 
the Code is incapable in the majority states of bringing the resulting fee into the estate. 
37. See Plumb, supra note 18, at 132-33. 
38. See id. 
39. The legislative history notes that the new bankruptcy rules will provide for this 
situation. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 3, at 360-361. Until then, the old rules remain 
in effect. Under those rules, many bankruptcy courts have permitted debtors to amend 
their exemption schedules when circumstances warranted. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 110; cf. 
PROPOSED FED. R. BANKR. P. 1009 (Mar. 1982) (permitting amendment as a matter of 
course). Because Congress intended the Code exemptions to serve as a floor in states that 
have not opted out, a debtor should not be forced to accept less as a result of an unfavor-
able ruling on a major exemption. See Kennedy, supra note 13, at 1063. Amendments to 
exemption schedules should be allowed when necessary to afford justice to the parties. 
See, e.g., Thompson v. Powell, 413 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1969); see also In re Skelton, 299 F. 
606 (N.D. Ga. 1924) (granting amendment which did not prejudice creditors); In re 
Korff, 14 Bankr. 189 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1981) (denying amendment from state to Code 
exemptions after state exemption in entirety property disallowed because joint creditors 
could have proceeded against joint petitioners' entirety property); Central Kan. Credit 
Union v. Lyon (In re Lyon), 2 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2d (MB) 561 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1980) 
(disallowing amendment after exemptions had been determined and a party in interest 
had sought affirmative relief based upon that determination). But see In re Powers, 339 
F. Supp. 1068 (W.D. Ark. 1972) (disallowing amendment where no error or mistake was 
made). 
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In three states which allow individual creditors to levy on the 
debtor's contingent right of survivorship, the result may differ_.0 
Because the debtor's right of survivorship is severable from the 
estate by the entirety, the trustee in those states collects the 
contingent right.0 Despite lacking the right of survivorship, the 
estate by the entirety does not become a joint tenancy'1 and the 
undivided interest remains immune from levy by individual 
creditors.43 Nevertheless, under state law,4'' if the nonindebted 
spouse dies, the entirety property vests in the trustee. 411 This re-
sult seems equitable because the debtor had no expectation of 
retaining the entirety property before the death of the non-
indebted spouse. 
Thus, in some states, section 541 precludes the availability of 
the entirety exemption upon the death of the debtor's spouse. 
The law in the majority states, however, offers its citizens this 
entirety exemption because it protects the right of survivorship. 
This loophole serves no purpose: the policy supporting the ex-
emption could be fulfilled just as well by permitting the debtor 
to amend his schedule_.6 The withholding of entirety prop-
erty from the bankruptcy estate in this situation decreases the 
amount available for distribution to creditors and thus increases 
credit costs;" Therefore, section 541(a)(5) should be amended to 
bring entirety property into the estate upon the death of the 
debtor's spouse;" A debtor in this situation should be allowed to 
40. The three states are Kentucky, Massachusetts, and Tennessee. In Massachusetts, 
only the husband's interest is leviable; in the other states, both spouses' interests are 
leviable. See Craig, supra note 18, at 258-59, 302; see also, e.g., Hoffman v. Newell, 249 
Ky. 270, 60 S~W.2d 607 (1932) (holding the individual interests of a debtor in an estate 
by the entirety, including the right of survivorship, subject to judgment liens and execu-
tion for the debtor's individual debts). 
41. Waldschmidt v. Shaw (In re Shaw), 5 Bankr. 107, 110 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1980); 
accord Ray v. Dawson (In re Dawson), 10 Bankr. 680 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.), aff'd, 14 
Bankr. 822 (E.D. Tenn. 1981); Stewart v. Huddleston (In re Stewart), 15 Bankr. 437 
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1981). 
42. See Craig, supra note 18, at 258-59. 
43. Waldschmidt v. Shaw (In re Shaw), 5 Bankr. 107, 110 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1980). 
The trustee may sell the right of survivorship, but for such a sale by a trustee to 
proceed, the court must find that the benefit to the estate outweighs the detriment to the 
nonindebted spouse. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(h)(3) (Supp. IV 1980); Ray v. Dawson (In re 
Dawson), 10 Bankr. 680 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.), aff'd, 14 Bankr. 822 (E.D. Tenn. 1981); 
Waldschmidt v. Shaw (In re Shaw), 5 Bankr. 107 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1980). 
44. State law determines whether a property interest such as a right of survivorship 
is leviable. See Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375 (1966). 
45. See 2 H. TIFFANY, supra note 14, § 430, at 218. 
46. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
47. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text. 
48. This could be effectuated by a transferability clause like that in § 70a of the old 
Act. See supra note 34. 
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amend his schedule to obtain the minimum exemptions pro-
vided by the Code. The preferred solution, how~ver, is to abolish 
the entirety exemption completely. 
II. PROCEDURAL DEVICES AVAILABLE TO JOINT CREDITORS To 
RECOVER ENTIRETY PROPERTY 
Until the entirety exemption is abolished, joint creditors 
should be made aware of three procedural devices that can be 
used to subject entirety property to bankruptcy distribution. 
These devices are (1) utilization of expanded bankruptcy juris-
diction, (2) the stay of discharge, a predischarge remedy, and (3) 
the reopening of the case, a postdischarge remedy. Courts, while 
retaining complete discretion in this area, are likely to invoke 
one of these. 
A. Utilization of Expanded Bankruptcy Jurisdiction 
The Bankruptcy Code revolutionizes jurisdiction of the 
bankruptcy courts.'9 These courts now have original but not ex-
clusive jurisdiction over all matters related to the bankruptcy 
proceeding,11° and exclusive jurisdiction over the debtor's prop-
erty.111 Several bankruptcy courts have asserted jurisdiction over 
all joint creditors and entirety property pursuant to these new 
provisions:~2 Under Code section 541(a), all of the debtor's inter-
est in entirety property becomes property of the esU)te. 113 If the 
court finds that joint creditors "could have obtained a joint 
judgment and satisfied the judgment out of entireties property," 
section 522(b) renders the property not exempt to the extent of 
the permissible levy.114 The trustee may then utilize section 
49. For an example of the reach of the courts' jurisdiction, see, e.g., Note, Bank-
ruptcy Court Jurisdiction To Modify Alimony Payments of Chapter 13 Debtors, 14 U. 
MICH. J.L. REF. 587 (1981). 
50. 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (Supp. III 1979). 
51. Id. § 1471(e). 
52. See Michigan Nat'! Bank v. Chrystler (In re Trickett), 14 Bankr. 85 (Bankr. W.D. 
Mich.), appeal filed, No. K 81-379 (W.D. Mich. 1981); Martine v. Cipa (In re Cipa), 11 
Bankr. 968 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1981); Hadley v. Koehler (In re Koehler), 6 Bankr. 203 
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1980). 
53. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (Supp. IV 1980); see In re Trickett, 14 Bankr. at 97; In re 
Ford, 3 Bankr. 559, 571 (Bankr. D. Md. 1980) (en bane), aff'd per curiam sub nom. 
Greenblatt v. Ford, 638 F.2d 14 (4th Cir. 1981). But see In re Jeffers, 3 Bankr. 49 
(Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1980). 
54. In re Trickett, 14 Bankr. at 90; accord In re Cipa, 11 Bankr. at 973; In re Koeh-
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363(h) to sell the entireties property, and distribute the proceeds 
to the joint creditors, the nonindebted spouse, and the debtor, as 
their respective interests dictate. 611 
This comprehensive procedure preempts the preferred proce-
dure under the old Act, the stay of discharge, which required the 
joint creditor to stay the bankruptcy discharge and proceed in 
state court to obtain a judgment and execution on the entirety 
property. 116 The expanded jurisdiction fulfills several goals of 
bankruptcy policy - it.enables the debtor to obtain a fresh start 
in one courtroom, without being dragged through several pro-
ceedings;117 it provides for speedier and more orderly disposition 
of the bankruptcy case;118 it enables joint creditors to satisfy 
their claims from the entirety property without being foiled 
by the intricacies of several proceedings;119 and it fulfills 
congressional intent supporting more equitable bankruptcy 
proceedings. 60 
Several bankruptcy courts, however, have failed to recognize 
their expanded jurisdiction and have granted a stay of discharge 
for joint creditors to pursue entirety property in state courts. 61 
The main reason may be0 that these courts feel more comfortable 
with the old procedures and have overlooked congressional in-
ler, 6 Bankr. at 206. 
55. This section provides: 
[T]he trustee may sell both the estate's interest, ... and the interest of any co-
owner in property in which the debtor had, immediately before the commence-
ment of the case, an undivided interest as a ... tenant by the entirety, only if 
(1) partition in kind of such property among the estate and such co-
owners is impracticable; 
(2) sale of the estate's undivided interest in such property would real-
ize significantly less for the estate than sale of such property free of the 
interests of such co-owners; 
(3) the benefit to the estate of a sale of such property free of the inter-
ests of co-owners outweighs the detriment, if any, to such co-owners; 
and 
(4) such property is not used in the production, transmission, or dis-
tribution, for sale, of electric energy or of natural or synthetic gas for 
heat, light, or power. 
11 U.S.C. § 363(h) (Supp. IV 1980); see In re Trickett, 14 Bankr. at 90-91; In re Cipa, 11 
Bankr. at 971-73; In re Koehler, 6 Bankr. at 206. 
56. See infra pt. II B. 
57. See In re Grimes, 6 Bankr. 943, 945 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1980); 1 COLLIER ON BANK-
RUPTCY 11 3.0l[l)[e) (15th ed. 1981). 
58. See H. R. REP. No. 595, supra note 3, at 445. 
59. See, e.g., In re Trickett, 14 Bankr. at 90. 
60. See H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 3, at 48-49, 52, 445. 
61. See Southern Nat'l Bank v. Woolard (In re Woolard), 13 Bankr. 105 (Bankr. E.D. 
N.C. 1981); In re Ford, 3 Bankr. 559, 576 (Bankr. D. Md. 1980) (en bane) (dictum), a{f'd 
per curiam sub nom. Greenblatt v. Ford, 638 F.2d 14 (4th Cir. 1981); infra pt. II B. 
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tent. 62 These courts, however, have rationalized their decisions 
by interpreting state exemption laws as rendering the debtor's 
interest in entirety property immune from the trustee's reach 
under section 363(h).68 Regardless of this interpretation, the de-
termination of a joint creditor's interest in entirety property is 
often the most crucial to a debtor's fresh start and therefore 
should be the responsibility of the bankruptcy court under its 
broad jurisdictional authority." The stay of discharge, however, 
must be examined so long as courts continue to use it as an eq-
uitable procedure available to creditors, and so long as bank-
ruptcy courts retain the discretion to def er to state court 
proceedings. H 
62. See Bass v. Thacker, 5 Bankr. 592, 595 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1980) ("There is noth-
ing in the Legislative History of § 522 which would indicate that Congress intended to 
change prior law in [regard to immunity of entirety property]."); In re Ford, 3 Bankr. at 
576 ("the ultimate effect of the Code on tenants by the entireties property in Maryland 
remains the same as it did under the Act"). 
63. A debtor's "individual undivided interest as , tenant by the entirety," which be-
came property of the estate, "is available to the joint creditor" unless "joined with the 
interests of the co-tenant wife;" thus, such interest "is exempt from process under Mary-
land law" and therefore exempt from distribution. In re Ford, 3 Bankr. at 575-76; see 
also Ray v. Dawson (In re Dawson), 10 Bankr. 680 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.), aff'd, 14 Bankr. 
822 (E.D. Tenn. 1981). But see In re Trickett, 14 Bankr. at 89-90 ("[T]he entireties 
property comes into the bankruptcy estate by operation of 11 U.S.C. § 541, and may be 
claimed as exempt as to joint creditors who, under Michigan law, could have obtained a 
joint judgment and satisfied the judgment out of the entireties property only to the ex-
tent of the $3,500 homestead exemption."); In re Cipa, 11 Bankr. at 971-73 ("[T]he 
debtor's undivided interest in the whole of the entireties property becomes a part of the 
estate, [and) the entireties property itself becomes subject to administration;" because "a 
joint creditor of [the debtor] and her husband could have executed on the ... entireties 
property, ... only the ownership equity in the [entireties] property over and above the 
joint creditor's lien would be immune from process under Pennsylvania law."); In re 
Koehler, 6 Bankr. at 206 ("[T]here are joint creditors of both spouses who, under the 
applicable [Florida) law, could have levied on the properties in question;" therefore, the 
trustee can liquidate despite § 522(b).); Kosto v. Lausch (In re Lausch), 16 Bankr. 162, 
165 (M.D. Fla. 1981) ("[A] debtor's interest in property held with his wife as tenants by 
the entirety is includable in the debtor's estate where the debtor and his wife have a 
common creditor who has a judgment on the property."). 
64. See 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ,i 3.0l[ll[e], at 3-48 (15th ed. 1981) ("It did strike 
one as odd that disputes which went to the very heart of the bankrupt's ability to make a 
fresh start were precisely those disputes over which the bankruptcy court had no juris-
diction and thus no control. This is no longer the case."). 
65. The Code grants bankruptcy courts original but not exclusive jurisdiction over 
matters related to the bankruptcy case. 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (Supp. III 1979); see Wal-
drop v. Phillos (In re Phillos), 14 Bankr. 781, 784 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1981). A bankruptcy 
court may abstain from hearing a particular proceeding if the abstention furthers the 
interest of justice. 28 U.S.C. § 147l(d) (Supp. III 1979). 
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B. Predischarge Stays of Bankruptcy Proceedings 
The stay of discharge postpones the debtor's discharge until 
the joint creditor is able to acquire and execute a judicial lien on 
the entirety property; The creditor must first obtain a state 
judgment against both spouses.86 Then, if the debtor's entirety 
property is located in one of the states in which a judgment does 
not constitute a lien, the creditor should obtain a lien;87 other-
wise, the debtor's discharge will void the judgment.88 To be com-
pletely protected, the creditor must execute the lien. If the cred-
itor fails to execute, the debtor may avoid the lien pursuant to 
section 522(f).89 Even 1f the debtor does not avoid the lien, the 
· debtor's discharge is likely to preclude the joint creditor from 
executing upon the lien. 70 
66. See, e.g., Citizens Saving Bank v. Astrin, 44 Del. 451, 61 A.2d 419 (1948); Held v. 
McNett, 154 A.2d 349 (Mun. Ct. App. D.C. 1959); Vaughan v. Mandis, 53 So.2d 704 (Fla. 
1951); Baker v. Cailor, 206 Ind. 440, 186 N.E. 769 (1933); Keen v. Keen, 191 Md. 31, 60 
A.2d 200 (1948); Licker v. Gluskin, 265 Maas. 403, 164 N.E. 613 (1929); American State 
Trust Co. v. Rosenthal, 255 Mich. 157, 237 N.W. 534 (1931); Hanebrink v. Tower Grove 
Bank & Trust Co., 321 S.W.2d 524 (Mo. Ct. App. 1959); In re Marsh's Estate, 125 Mont. 
239, 234 P.2d 459 (1951); In re Ved Elva, Inc., 260 F. Supp. 978 (D.N.J. 1966); In re 
Dickie's Will, 55 Misc. 2d 976, 286 N.Y.S.2d 893 (Sur. Ct. 1968); L & M Gas Co. v. 
Leggett, 273 N.C. 547, 161 S.E.2d 23 (1968); Hargrove v. Taylor, 236 Or. 451, 389 P.2d 36 
(1964); Amadon v. Amadon, 359 Pa. 434, 59 A.2d 135 (1948); Bloomfield v. Brown, 67 
R.I. 452, 25 A.2d 354 (1942); United States v. Ragsdale, 206 F. Supp. 613 (W.D. Tenn. 
1962); Citizens' Sav. Bank v. Jenkins, 91 Vt. 13, 99 A. 250 (1916); Masonry Products, Inc. 
v. Tees, 280 F. Supp. 654 (D.V.I. 1968); Vasilion v. Vasilion, 192 Va. 735, 66 S.E.2d 599 
(1951); Ward Terry & Co. v. Hensen, 75 Wyo. 444, 297 P.2d 213 (1956). 
67. In Michigan, a joint judgment will not yield a lien for the joint creditor. See 
MlcH. COMP. LAWS§ 557.53 (1979); see also Bauer v. Long, 147 Mich. 351, 110 N.W. 1059 
(1907) (holding that a husband owning land by the entirety has no interest therein, or 
right of possession during his lifetime, to which a lien may attach under any contract not 
signed by the wife). This is also the rule in Kentucky and the New England states except 
Connecticut. See J. MooRE, W. PHILLIPS & R. o'AGOS'rlNO, IJEBToRS' AND CREDITORS' 
RIGHTS 5-8 (5th ed. 1979). The prevailing rule is that the judgment becomes a lien upon 
docketing or recording. Id.; see, e.g., Hulbert v. Hulbert, 216 N.Y. 430, 111 N.E. 70 
(1916). 
68. The Code provides: "A discharge ... voids any judgment ... to the extent that 
such judgment is a determination of the personal liability of the debtor . . . . " 11 U.S.C. 
§ 524(a)(l) (Supp. IV 1980). 
69. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (Supp. IV 1980); see In re Ford, 3 Bankr. 559, 576 (Bankr. D. 
-Md. 1980) (en bane), atf'd per curiam sub nom. Greenblatt v. Ford, 638 F.2d 14 (4th Cir. 
1981). But see Michigan Nat1 Bank v. Chrystler (In re Trickett), 14 Bankr. 85, 89 
(Bankr. W.D. Mich.), appeal filed, No. K 81-379 (W.D. Mich. 1981); Martine v. Cipa (In 
re Cipa), 11 Bankr. 968, 973 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1981); Williamson v. Denson (In re Wil-
liamson), 11 Bankr. 791 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1981). 
70. Code section 524(a)(2) reads: "A discharge ... operates as an injunction against 
the commencement or continuation of an action, the employment of process, or any act, 
to collect, recover or offset any such debt as a personal liability of the debtor, or from 
property of the debtor .... " 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2). The language of this section is not 
clear. The section must be read in light of § 522(c), which states that a lien may be 
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Even when a stay of discharge extends the proceedings be-
yond the statutorily set time frame for a discharge,71 it is nor-
mally granted with little question72 because it furthers the policy 
of achieving an equitable distribution of assets to the discharge 
of debts. Because the joint creditor would be unable to recover 
on a claim after the debtor is discharged,78 the stay will usually 
be deemed appropriate. 74 Only if the claim of a joint creditor is 
enforced against exempt property provided that the lien was not avoided under the trus-
tee's avoiding provisions in the Code or under § 506(d). See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 11 
524.01, at 524-14 (15th ed. 1981). Section 522(c), however, covers only valid liens. H.R. 
REP. No. 595, supra note 3, at 361. The legislative history states that § 522(c) is based on 
Long v. Bullard, 117 U.S. 617 (1886). Id. That case protects only liens that attach prior 
to the filing of the bankruptcy petition. See 117 U.S. at 621. Therefore,§ 522(c) does not 
protect postpetition liens, and § 524(a)(2) enjoins their enforcement against the debtor's 
property. 
71. The bankruptcy rules require the court to grant a discharge within 90 days of the 
first meeting of creditors, subject to certain exceptions. FED. R. BANKR. P. 404(d); cf. 
PROPOSED FEo. R. BANKR. P. 4004(c) (Mar. 1982) (discharge to be granted within 60 days 
of the first meeting of creditors, subject to certain exceptions). Section 522(c) of the 
Code can be interpreted as preventing the stay. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(c) (Supp. IV 1980). 
This section has proved to be no obstacle, however, to the approval of the stay in equity. 
See, e.g., Leonard v. Walter (In re Walter), 1 COLLIER BANKR. CAs. 2d (MB) 460 (Bankr. 
W.D. Mich. 1980); Ackerly, supra note 4, at 721-26. The first case to permit the stay of 
discharge in a case involving entirety property was Phillips v. Krakower, 46 F.2d 764 
(4th Cir. 1931), in which the court declared that the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act was 
to distribute equitably the debtor's assets before discharge is granted. Dictum to this 
effect had already been given by the Supreme Court: "There [sh]ould exist in favor of a 
creditor . . . an equity entitling him to a reasonable postponement of the discharge of 
the bankrupt, in order to allow the institution in the state court of such proceedings as 
might be necessary to make effective the rights posseBSed by the creditor." Lockwood v. 
Exchange Bank, 190 U.S. 294, 300 (1903). In Lockwood, the possibility of obtaining such 
a stay was conceived by the Court to support its jurisdictional ruling that exempt prop-
erty need not be brought into the estate. Although exempt property is now made part of 
the estate under § 541(a)(l), this change has no effect on the stay, which exists regard-
less of whether exempted property is subject to inclusion. See Phillips v. Krakower, 46 
F.2d 764 (4th Cir. 1931). 
72. See, e.g., Phillips v. Krakower, 46 F.2d 764 (4th Cir. 1931); Rensenhouse Elec. 
Supply Co. v. Magee (In re Magee), 415 F. Supp. 521 (W.D. Mo. 1976); Southern Nat'! 
Bank v. Woolard (In re Woolard), 13 Bankr. 105 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1981). 
73. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (Supp. IV 1980). 
74. Only one judge has veered from Phillips' reasoning, and his holding was over-
ruled one year later. See Davison v. Virginia Nat'! Bank, 493 F.2d 1220 (4th Cir. 1974), 
overruling In re Bruno, (1970-1973 Transfer Binder) BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 1164,767 
(E.D. Va. 1973). Other cases following Phillips incluQe Roanoke Indus. Loan & Thrift 
Corp. v. Bishop (In re Bishop), 482 F.2d 381 (4th Cir. 1973); Rensenhouse Elec. Supply 
Co. v. Magee (In re Magee), 415 F. Supp. 521 (W.D. Mo. 1976); In re Saunders, 365 F. 
Supp. 1351 (W.D. Va. 1973); Waldrop v. Phillos (In re Phillos), 14 Bankr. 781 (Bankr. 
W.D. Va. 1981); Southern Nat'! Bank v. Woolard (In re Woolard), 13 Bankr. 105 (Bankr. 
· E.D.N.C. 1981); In re Goldman, No. 81-01676-B (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Nov. 16, 1981); In re 
Ford, 3 Bankr. 559, 576 (Bankr. D. Md. 1980) (en bane) (dictum), aff'd per curiam sub 
nom. Greenblatt v. Ford, 638 F.2d 14 (4th Cir. 1981); Leonard v. Walter (In re Walter), 1 
COLLIER BANKR. CAs. 2d (MB) 460 (Bankr .. W.D. Mich. 1980); Old Kent Bank & Trust 
Co. v. Black (In re Black), 14 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. (MB) 481 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1977). 
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"clearly invalid" under state law will a court deny a motion for a 
stay.76 Otherwise, courts have granted a stay in a variety of cir-
cumstances: where a joint creditor files his motion for a stay af-
ter the expiration of the period set by the court for objecting to 
a discharge;78 where a home, rather than investment property, is 
sought;77 and where the joint judgment against the husband and 
wife is for a tort, rather than a contractual obligation.78 A court 
may, however, condition the stay.79 For example, it may limit 
the time for completion of the state proceeding.80 Extensions are 
possible after notice and a hearing are given to the debtor and 
the creditor shows good cause. 81 
While the stay of discharge seems readily available, some com-
mentators have raised objections to it. It has been argued that 
this equitable remedy should not override the policy which calls 
for swift administration of the case. 81 But the stay should rarely 
cause a substantial delay, because the case may proceed with the 
stay in effect - the stay merely prevents the granting of a dis-
charge. A second objection is that the stay might confer upon a 
joint creditor a preference, contrary to the policy of treating all 
creditors in the same class equally and uniformly. All joint credi-
tors, however, may take advantage of the stay of discharge.88 A 
Note that a motion for stay of discharge must ask for relief from the automatic stay as 
provided in 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (Supp. IV 1980). 
75. Roanoke Indus. Loan & Thrift Corp. v. Bishop (In re Bishop), 482 F.2d 381, 384 
(4th Cir. 1973). 
76. See Rensenhouse Elec. Supply Co. v. Magee (In re Magee), 415 F. Supp. 521 
(W.D. Mo. 1976). The court came to this conclusion despite rule 906(b)(2), which re-
quires "excusable neglect" after the expiration of the specified period for objecting to the 
discharge. FED. R. BANKR. P. 906(b)(2). But see id. 404(c) ("The court may for cause, on 
its own initiative or on application of any party in interest, extend the time for filing a 
complaint objecting to discharge."). 
77. See Leonard v. Walter (In re Walter), 1 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2d (MB) 460, 462 
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1980). 
78. See id. at 462-63. 
79. See id. at 464. 
80. See Old Kent Bank & Trust Co. v. Black (In re Black), 14 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 
(MB) 481, 488 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1977). Magee allowed a stay until prosecution of the 
state claim was complete. In re Magee, 415 F. Supp. at 530. 
81. See In re Black, 14 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. at 481; see also In re Leonard, 1 COL-
LIER BANKR. CAS. 2d (MB) at 464. 
82. See Kennedy, Limitation of Exemptions in Bankruptcy, 45 lowA L. REv. 445, 
462-67 (1960); Comment, Bankruptcy Exemptions: Critique and Suggestions, 68 YALE 
L.J. 1459, 1477-78 (1959). 
83. Notice to "all creditors" is required by FED. R. BANKR. P. 203(a). One bankruptcy 
court has wisely required the joint creditor to join the debtor's other joint creditors in 
the state proceeding. See Waldrop v. Philloa (In re Phillos), 14 Bankr. 781 (Bankr. W.D. 
Va. 1981). 
It seems reasonable to separate joint creditors from unsecured creditors due to the 
expectation of greater security provided by the liability of two persons. 
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third argument - that the stay is inconsistent with the debtor's 
power to avoid liens on exempt property"' - is countered by 
pointing out that the entirety property is no longer exempt once 
the judicial lien is obtained and executed. Additionally, the ar-
guments. supporting abolition of the entirety exemption also 
warrant making the stay readily available to joint creditors. 811 If, 
however, a stay cannot be obtained, a joint creditor may resort 
to other procedural devices to reach entirety property.88 
C. Postdischarge Reopening of the Bankruptcy Case 
Creditors can also bring entirety property into the bankruptcy 
estate through postdischarge reopening of the case. Before 1938, 
an estate could be reopened only for the purpose of discovering 
84. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(0 (Supp. IV 1980). 
85. See supra text accompanying notes 25-29. 
86. Creditors also have the option of bringing the nonindebted spouse into the case 
by filing an involuntary petition if the nonindebted spouse is not meeting his or her 
debts as they become due. See 11 U.S.C. § 303 (Supp. IV 1980). A consolidation is then 
possible. FED. R. BANKR. P. 117(b); see PROPOSED FED. R. BANKR. P. 1015(b) (Mar. 1982). 
The conditions set forth in Code §§ 303(b), (0, and (h) strike a compromise between 
allowing creditors to obtain entirety property and the separate property of the 
nonindebted spouse in all cases where one spouse is in bankruptcy, and limiting the 
access of creditors to what they can obtain by a stay of discharge. Section 303(b) condi-
tions the involuntary petition upon the creditors' having a sufficient amount of outstand-
ing claims at stake. If 12 or more creditors hold claims, then 3 or more holders of claims 
(or indenture trustees representing such holders) may file the involuntary petition. Also, 
the creditors who file must have claims aggregating "at least $5,000 more than the value 
of any lien on property of the debtor securing such claims." 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(l). If 
there are fewer than 12 holders of claims, only I or more of them need hold at least 
$5,000 of claims in the aggregate. Id. § 303(b)(2). Also, the debtor may remain in posses-
sion of the property during the proceedings, id. § 303(0, except to the extent that the 
court orders otherwise due to a fraudulent transfer or some other deception of the joint 
creditor. These conditions, and others, ameliorate the possible damage a debtor might 
suffer from an involuntary petition. Furthermore, once one spouse is in bankruptcy, con-
solidation is desirable for joint creditors if the debtor's spouse is unlikely to meet the 
couple's joint and several debts. The § 303 conditions, therefore, should protect the 
nonindebted spouse from overzealous joint creditors. 
On the other hand, making the § 303 conditions more strict would be undesirable. The 
joint creditor may become remediless if the nonindebted spouse is able to meet his or her 
debts until enough time has passed so that a court would not reopen the debtor's case. 
Nevertheless, a joint creditor should not be allowed to obtain a consolidation via an in-
voluntary petition merely because the nonindebted spouse may file a bankruptcy peti-
tion in the future. Because consolidation is an equitable remedy, it should be limited to 
those cases in which the joint creditor is actually harmed by a bad debt loss. Anticipa-
tion of harm would yield inappropriate results. Also, if the good faith of the nonindebted 
spouse is a consideration in granting consolidation, such subjective determinations may 
lead to the abuse of the joint creditors' remedies. The § 303 conditions provide for the 
benefits of consolidation when entirety property is involved while protecting the spouse 
who is subjected to an involuntary bankruptcy. 
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unadministered assets. 87 The Chandler Act amended section 
2a(8) of the old Bankruptcy Act to allow reopening "for cause 
shown. "88 This expanded remedy is carried over in the Code, 
which permits reopening "to administer assets, to accord relief 
to the debtor, or for other cause."89 Courts have allowed within 
this expanded remedy the amendment of creditor lists, 80 the re-
payment of excess fees withdrawn in violation of orders of the 
district court,91 and the investigation of alleged fraudulent 
transfers. 92 
Several factors are weighed in determining what constitutes 
sufficient cause to reopen. 98 The most important is the length of 
time between the discharge and the reopening of the case; courts 
have usually allowed the defense of laches. 94 Another important 
factor is whether the creditor could have sought a stay of dis-
charge had he been diligent.90 Given the prevalence of the stay,98 
this factor may more readily warrant the denial of a petition to 
reopen. The condition of the debtor's assets may also affect a 
court's decision. If property bought on credit has been substan-
tially improved, the court may be less inclined to resubject it to 
bankruptcy, especially if the debtor has made substantial pay-
ments on the debt and the property has increased in value.97 
87. See Kinder v. Scharff, 231 U.S. 517 (1913); In re Schreiber, 23 F.2d 428 (2d Cir. 
1928); In re Chapman, 55 F.2d 965 (N.D.N.Y. 1931). 
88. Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 2a(8), 52 Stat. 840 (repealed 1978) (amending 
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, 30 Stat. 544, 546). 
89. 11 U.S.C. § 350(b) (Supp. IV 1980). 
90. See Casey v. Cooledge, 234 Ala. 499, 175 So. 557 (1937). 
91. See Ehrhorn v. International Match Realization Co. (In re International Match 
Corp.), 190 F.2d 458 (2d Cir. 1951). 
92. See In re Baker, 299 F. Supp. 404 (W.D. Mo. 1969). 
93. See 61 MICH. L. REV. 1351, 1354 (1963). 
94. See Kavanagh v. Kayes (In re Fair Creamery Co.), 193 F.2d 5, 7-8 (6th Cir. 1951) 
(holding that delay of seven years and the lack of available assets militated against re-
opening); Brust v. Irving Trust Co., 129 F. Supp. 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (barring reopening 
where petitioners knew of the possibility of a fraudulent transfer action for two years); 
Waldschmidt v. Shaw (In re Shaw), 5 Bankr. 107 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1980) (refusing 
reopening where four years had elapsed); see also In re United Brick & Tile Co., 94 F. 
Supp. 269 (D. Del. 1950) (holding that a court may limit the time for reopening a case). 
Because !aches is an equitable defense, however, a court may deny it if the debtor has 
acted in such a way that permitting the defense would be inequitable. See In re Thomas, 
204 F.2d 788, 794 (7th Cir. 1953) (denying laches defense where the debtor failed to 
furnish complete and accurate schedules of assets). 
95. See Waldschmidt v. Shaw (In re Shaw), 5 Bankr. 107, 112 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 
1980). Relevant here is the length of time between filing and discharge, rather than be-
tween discharge and reopening. But see Maryland Hotel Supply Co. v. Seats (In re 
Seats), 537 F.2d 1176, 1177 (4th Cir. 1976) (holding that the lack of diligence by the joint 
creditor's attorney did not prejudice the joint creditor's claim). 
96. See supra notes 71-81 and accompanying text. 
97. See In re Shaw, 5 Bankr. at 111. 
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Balanced against these factors is the resulting delay of the 
debtor's fresh start. The discharged debtor begins his fresh start 
on the filing date, subject to any successful objections by a credi-
tor or the trustee during a period fixed by the bankruptcy 
court. 98 Once creditors have been allowed to object to the dis-
charge and have not done so, the court must grant a discharge to 
inaugurate the debtor's fresh start.99 Creditors' opportunity to 
object after di~charge should be limited. Accordingly, courts are 
less willing to reopen a case than to grant a stay of the dis-
charge. 100 However, if circumstances warrant delaying the 
debtor's fresh start to further administer assets or for other 
cause, courts will reopen cases.101 
Courts are most likely to reopen a case when one spouse files 
in bankruptcy soon after the discharge of the other spouse. If a 
couple files jointly,102 the trustee obtains the full entirety estate 
by virtue of holding each spouse's interests.103 Even if a couple 
98. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(c) (Supp. IV 1980). 
99. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 404(d)(l); PROPOSED FED. R. BANKR. P. 4004(c) (Mar. 
1982). 
100. See Reid v. Richardson, 304 F.2d 351, 355 (4th Cir. 1962) ("an exercise of the 
power to re-open an estate is a much more drastic remedy than an exercise of the power 
to temporarily delay a discharge"). 
101. See 11 U.S.C. § 350(b) (incorporating § 2a(8) from the old Act and permitting 
reopening for cause). This determination involves balancing the debtor's interests 
against those of the joint creditors'. See, e.g., Davison v. Virginia Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d 
1220, 1222 (9th Cir. 1979); Roanoke Indus. Loan & Thrift Corp. v. Bishop (In re Bishop), 
482 F.2d 381, 383-84 (4th Cir. 1973); Reid v. Richardson, 304 F.2d 351, 355 (4th Cir. 
1962); Phillips v. Krakower, 46 F.2d 764, 765-66 (4th Cir. 1931); Fetter v. United States, 
269 F.2d 467, 471 (6th Cir. 1959); United States v. Hart, 382 F. Supp. 244, 246 (D.D.C. 
1974); In re Baker, 299 F. Supp. 404, 406 (W.D. Mo. 1969); 61 MICH. L. REv. 1351 (1963). 
102. The Code offers married couples the option of joint administration. See 11 
U.S.C. § 302 (Supp. IV 1980). 
103. See, e.g., In re Korff, 14 Bankr. 189, 193 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1981); Ragsdale v. 
Genesco (In re Ragsdale), 9 Bankr. 991 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1981). Before the Chandler Act 
of 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (repealed 1978), courts attempted to create a legal basis for 
permitting a trustee, who had forged a consolidation of a couple's separate cases and 
thereby obtained both spouses' interests, to merge the interests into a fee simple for 
administration of the entirety property in bankruptcy. Under one theory, utilizing § 70c 
of the old Act (the predecessor of Code section 544(a)), a trustee was a judgment creditor 
for both the husband and the wife, from which he derived the status of a joint lien 
creditor, enabling him to take entireties property. See In re Utz, 7 F. Supp. 612 (D. Md. 
1934). Courts and commentators, however, rejected this theory because "a creditor is 
only able to pursue the entirety if he has obtained a joint judgment against both spouses 
at the same time." Craig, supra note 18, at 269 (emphasis added). Courts derived a 
second theory from the trustee's power under § 70a(5), 11 U.S.C. § 110(a)(5) (1976) (re-
pealed 1978), to take property which became transferable within six months of filing. 
The theory was that, because both spouses were in bankruptcy, both could have triµis-
ferred the property together and, therefore, the trustee took all. See In re Carpenter, 5 
F. Supp. 101 (M.D. Pa. 1933). In order for the trustee to have gained title to the prop-
erty under § 70a(5), however, the debtor must have been able to transfer the property 
"prior to the filing of the petition." 11 U.S.C. § 110a(5) (1976) (repealed 1978). The .issue 
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files separately and simultaneously, a consolidation is easily ob-
tained with the same result.104 But if one spouse files soon after 
the other spouse has obtained a discharge and had his case 
closed, consolidation is not available without reopening the dis-
charged spouse's case.1011 Finding separate administration to con-
stitute "legal fraud," courts have reopened the discharged 
spouse's case for consolidation.108 
Courts may be more reluctant to reopen a case to allow a joint 
creditor to pursue his claim against entirety property in state 
court. The joint creditor cannot plead "legal fraud" in such 
cases. Nevertheless, the only court to have considered the issue 
as of this writing permitted reopening.107 While that opinion 
was resolved in Roberts v. Henry V. Dick & Co., 275 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1960). Citing 
both Utz and Carpenter, the court opted for an equitable solution, stating that it "would 
be unreasonable to attach the significance contended for by the [debtors] to the fact that 
the husband and wife filed separate petitions." Id. at 945. 
104. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 117(b); PROPOSED FED. R. BANKR. P. 1015(b) (Mar. 1982). 
Once a couple's cases are consolidated, the trustee may administer the couple's joint 
assets. 
105. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 117(b) (consolidation applies when the petitions "are 
pending in the same court"); accord PROPOSED FED. R. BANKR. P. 1015(b) (Mar. 1982). 
106. See Reid v. Richardson, 304 F.2d 351 (4th Cir. 1962); 22 MD. L. Rsv. 162 (1962); 
61 M1cH. L. REv. 1351 (1963); 33 Miss. L.J. 399 (1962); 19 WASH. & LEE L. Rsv. 297 
(1962); 64 W. VA. L. REv. 338 (1962); see also Maryland Hotel Supply Co. v. Seats (In re 
Seats), 537 F.2d 1176 (4th Cir. 1976). But see Security Indus. Loan Ass'n v. Pearson (In 
re Hawks), 471 F.2d 305 (4th Cir. 1973). 
That the creditors who sought a reopening in these cases were unsecured may be rele-
vant in determining how the newly obtained property should be distributed. See infra 
note 110. 
107. Maryland Hotel Supply Co. v. Seats (In re Seats), 537 F.2d 1176 (4th Cir. 1976). 
The procedural device for reopening a case escaped the attention of creditors in Harris 
v. Manufacturers Nat'! Bank, 457 F.2d 631 (6th Cir. 1972). In Harris, a creditor was 
enjoined from subjecting entirety property to the satisfaction of a joint judgment be-
cause the husband's debts had been discharged in bankruptcy. The creditor did not peti-
tion the bankruptcy court to stay the discharge, although the state court proceeding be-
gan before discharge, because substantial state precedent existed giving creditors a joint 
judgment against married couples despite one spouse's prior discharge. See Kolakowski 
v. Cyman, 285 Mich. 585,281 N.W. 332 (1938); Edwards & Chamberlin Hardware Co. v. 
Pethick, 250 Mich. 315, 230 N.W. 186 (1930). Creditors (and courts) in Michigan at the 
time of the Harris proceedings were not familiar with stays of discharge and petitions to 
reopen. Interview with staff of General Counsel's Office, Manufacturers Nat'l Bank of 
Detroit, Detroit, Mich. (March 9, 1981). 
While it is uncertain whether a petition to reopen would have been successful, the 
Harris court did not consider the factors relevant to a reopening. Instead, Harris 
adopted a narrow interpretation of the effect of a discharge, citing Local Loan Co. v. 
Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934), as holding that the "overriding" purpose of the Bank-
ruptcy Act is to provide the debtor with a fresh start. Actually, the Supreme Court said 
that this is "one of the primary purposes of the bankruptcy act." Id. (emphasis added). 
A second and equally important purpose of bankruptcy is to distribute equitably the 
assets of debtors among their creditors. See Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 645-46 
(1974); COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 71. If the Harris court had considered both 
purposes, it would have been compelled to consider the propriety of reopening the case 
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failed to articulate the reasons justifying the result, a court 
should logically consider two factors. First, it should determine 
the propriety of reopening the case. Relevant factors include the 
time elapsed between the discharge and the petition to reopen, 
and whether the joint creditor was unable initially to stay the 
discharge due to internal delays or ignorance about such proce-
dures.108 Second, there is little reason to deny a timely and equi-
table motion to reopen a case for modification of the discharge if 
consolidation is unavailable and the joint creditor could not oth-
erwise satisfy his claim. The debtor's spouse, for instance, may 
not be severally liable, or may be severally liable but unable to 
pay the debt.109 The debtor's fresh start, though delayed, should 
not be harmed, because the debtor has no legitimate expectation 
of retaining entirety property claimed by a joint creditor. If the 
debtor loses the entirety property, he should be allowed to 
amend his petition to claim the minimum Code exemptions. 
Reopening cases in the proper circumstances can be an effec-
tive tool for ensuring the equitable distribution of assets. 11° Fail-
- assuming it would have recognized such a procedure. 
The court in Maryland Hotel Supply Co. v. Seats (In re Seats), 537 F.2d 1176 (4th Cir. 
1976), allowed reopening on facts very similar to those in Harris. In each case, creditors 
sought a joint judgment in state court soon after the debtor filed a petition in bank-
ruptcy. Neither case involved a significant lapse of time between the debtor's discharge 
and the joint creditor's attempt to remedy his predicament. In Seats, the joint creditor's 
attorney objected to the discharge, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (Supp. IV 1980), 18 
days after it was granted. (Rather than objecting to the discharge, the proper procedure 
would have been to move for a reopening of the bankruptcy case, if it has been closed, 
and for a modification of the discharge.) In Harris, the debtor's discharge was granted on 
November 2, 1970, and the creditor's objection was raised on March 11, 1971, when the 
debtor initiated an action in the district court to enjoin the creditor's state proceeding. 
457 F.2d at 632. 
108. See supra notes 93-97. In Seats, the joint creditor's attorney knew of the en-
tirety property and was 18 days late but the court decided that the attorney's lack of 
diligence should not prejudice his client. See 537 F.2d at 1177. 
109. While most states provide that joint debts are to be treated as joint and several, 
this is not true in some states. See 4 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 930, at 728 (1951). Reopen-
ing to modify the discharge should be available in states where joint creditors are not 
severally liable. Virginia law, which governed in Seats, holds joint debtors severally lia-
ble. Va. Code§§ 8.01-.30, 8.55-2.35 (1950). The Seats opinion does not disclose, however, 
the extent to which the debtor's spouse was able to satisfy the joint debt. Consequently, 
it is not clear whether Seats was decided correctly. Even if it was not, such a reopening 
should be available in other circumstances. 
110. A consequent problem is deciding whether the assets should be distributed to 
satisfy the claims of all creditors, only individual creditors, or only joint creditors. The 
commentators disagree. Compare Ackerly, supra note 4, at 706 n.23 (joint creditors 
should be satisfied first), and Plumb, supra note 18, at 127-28 (same), with Craig, supra 
note 18, at 271 (all creditors should share equally), and Bienenfeld, supra note 14, at 114 
(same), and Comment, Creditors' Rights, supra note 24, at 283 (same). One case on 
point held that the creditors must share equally. In re Carpenter, 5 F. Supp. 101 (M.D. 
Pa. 1933). The Code, however, provides that claims against the community in states 
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ure to reopen the case permits debtors to use the unlimited en-
tirety exemption to the detriment of bankruptcy policy and the 
credit system. In the absence of clear standards to be applied 
and considering the difficulty of balancing the complex and mul-
tifarious interests of the debtor and joint creditors, judges 
should be granted considerable discretion to reopen cases. m In 
this way, a debtor may retain his fresh start once !aches or other 
equitable circumstances so warrant, while creditors are treated 
equitably rather than subjected to an absolute and irrevocable 
discharge. 
CONCLUSION 
Congress should not have included the entirety exemption in 
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. 112 The Code does take a 
step in the right direction by severing the entirety estate if Code 
exemptions are chosen, but its solution is unsatisfactory. It 
places no maximum limit on the amount of entirety exemptions 
if a debtor chooses the state exemptions. Though individual 
creditors have no recourse to plug this loophole, joint creditors 
can resort to various procedural devices to distribute or levy and 
execute upon entirety property. Despite strong arguments favor-
ing distribution of entirety property, however, no procedural de-
vice is certain to be available. Furthermore, no creditor can fore-
stall the loophole which permits debtors to retain .all entirety 
property if the debtor's spouse dies within six months of the 
filing of the bankruptcy petition. Because it is inequitable and 
which have community property are satisfied first from the community property that 
may be applied to the debts of both spouses, and then property liable for the debtor's 
debts is used. 11 U.S.C. § 726(c)(2) (Supp. IV 1980). 
111. This broad discretion has, however, not been accompanied by sufficient procedu-
ral safeguards. As of this writing, the precedent remains that notice to a discharged 
debtor is unnecessary to reopen his estate. See In re Carlucci Stone Co., 269 F. 795 
(M.D. Pa. 1920). This decision came at a time when reopening was allowed only when 
some of the debtor's assets had not been administered. Today, a creditor may reopen on 
much broader grounds. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text. Such a depriva-
tion of property certainly warrants procedural due process. See 61 MICH. L. REV. 1351, 
1354 (1963). 
The issue of balancing is a matter of federal law; conflicting state laws are subordinate. 
See Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 649 (1971) (declaring that a state statute is an 
unconstitutional infringement on federal supremacy if it "stands as an obstacle to the 
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress") (quoting 
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
112. It has long been suggested that Congress remove the privileged status of entirety 
property in bankruptcy. See, e.g., Note, The Effect of Bankruptcy on Estates by Entire-
ties, 89 U. PA. L. Rsv. 1073, 1081 (1941). 
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harmful to the open credit system, the entirety exemption 
should be repealed. 
-Frank J. Spivak 
